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Abstract
Why do sudden and massive social, economic, and political changes occur when and where they
do? Are there institutional preconditions that encourage such changes when present and discourage such
changes when absent? I employ a general model which suggests that cascades which induce massive equi-
librium changes are more likely to occur in regimes with centralized coercive power, defined as the ability
to impose more than one type of sanction (economic, legal, political, social, or religious). Centralized au-
thorities are better able to suppress subversive actions when external shocks are small, as citizens have little
incentive to incur numerous types of sanctions. However, citizens are also more likely to lie about their
internal preferences in such regimes (e.g., falsely declare loyalty to an oppressive government), entailing
that larger shocks are more likely to trigger a cascade to a vastly different equilibrium. The model is applied
to the severity of protests that followed austerity measures taken in developing nations since the 1970s.
I am extremely grateful to Andy Gill, Avner Greif, Kristin Kleinjans, Timur Kuran, Michael Makowsky, and Jonathan Meer for
their extremely helpful insights. Comments received at seminars at Duke’s "Islam and Economic Development" Conference, Cal State
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1 Introduction
Economists, political scientists, and sociologists are well aware that small events may act as a spark which
leads to a significant change in equilibrium outcomes. Granovetter (1978) was amongst the first to argue that
cascades can arise when individuals’ preferences are interconnected - if enough people take some action it
encourages others to do the same, which encourages more to do the same, and so on until a vastly different
equilibrium results. In some cases, small events encourage some individuals to publicly reveal their previ-
ously suppressed, privately held preferences, which leads to information revelation or changes in status, in
turn resulting in starkly different equilibria (Granovetter 1978; Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira 1985; Kuran
1989, 1991, 1995a, 1995b, 1998; Macy 1991; Bernheim 1994; Yin 1998; Kuran and Sunstein 1999; Kuran
and Sandholm 2008). In other instances, such events act as a signal in the decision process, leading to social
learning phenomena such as herd behavior and informational cascades that encourage individuals to ignore
their private information and follow the actions of others (Banerjee 1992, 1993; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch 1992, 1998; Lohmann 1994; Callander 2007; Watts and Dodds 2007; Siegel 2009; Ellis and
Fender 2011).1
The theoretical and experimental literature in economics focuses primarily on how the interactions amongst
agents precipitates cascades, but provides little macroeconomic or institutional conditions under which such
behavior is likely to arise (Anderson and Holt 1997; Banerjee 1992, 1993; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch 1992, 1998; Çelen and Kariv 2004; Kübler and Weizsäcker 2004, 2005; Goeree et al. 2007; Alevy
et al. 2007).2 The works which do study the institutional conditions under which such behaviors emerge
focus primarily on the role that social or political sanctions play in suppressing private opposition to a regime
(Kuran 1989, 1995a; Lohmann 1994; Rasler 1996; Slater 2009).
Yet, by merely focusing on the political structures in which such phenomena arise, it is possible to over-
look the general microeconomic settings under which these behaviors are facilitated. This paper aims to
shed light on these settings, formulating a general model which applies to all types of sanctioning authority
(economic, legal, political, social, or religious). It extends on the works cited above, suggesting that cascades
1Oliver (1993) provides an overview of the sociological advances made in this literature in the 1980s and early 1990s. Sushil Bikhchan-
dani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch have organized a website, http://www.info-cascades.info/, which provides a literature review and
links, as of 2004, to articles on information cascades.
2Ellis and Fender (2011) consider the role that information cascades play in revolutionary regime transition, but they model the two
phenomena separately instead of intergrating the two.
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which induce massive economic, social, or political changes may be one consequence of an institutional
arrangement in which one type of authority has multi-lateral coercive power - that is, the ability to affect
sanctions over numerous dimensions. I formulate a model with three types of agents: a group of citizens and
two different institutional authorities. The latter players can be thought of as religious authorities, political
figures, social icons, or legal authorities. One of the authorities is a "central" authority, with the degree of cen-
tralization being the level of the cost imposed on the other authority for transgressing the central authority’s
dictates.3
Previous works have focused on "central authorities" primarily in a political context, as the most obvious
examples come from the political world. For example, political, economic, and religious power in Iran is
"centralized" in the religious establishment. It is costly for political or economic leaders to openly violate the
dictates of religious authorities, which implicitly gives the religious authorities power over numerous types
of sanctions. The same could be said about the leaders of the Communist Party in China or for the autocratic
Arab dictators (e.g., Mubarak, Khadafi) who faced major protests (for reasons highlighted in this model)
in the Arab Spring of 2011. Yet, the same also could be said for the medieval Church, which controlled
numerous aspects of one’s life, especially for members of the Church, before facing major protests during the
Reformation.4
The model analyzes the interactions between citizens and the authorities under the situation where the
preferences of the latter are not aligned with those of the former. Citizens derive intrinsic utility from their
own actions and have sanctions imposed on them for publicly rejecting (i.e., protesting) the actions of the
two institutional authorities. These actions could represent any number of phenomena in which the desires of
some citizens diverge from those of institutional authorities, such as speaking or writing freely, having more
than one child, or practicing minority religions. Citizens’ utility is also interdependent with other citizens
3Throughout this paper, I use the term "centralized" to indicate the degree to which coercive power over sanctions affecting different
aspects of one’s life (e.g., political, religious, social) is concentrated in one authority. This is similar to the structure recently proposed
by Slater (2009), who looks at the role that the separation between political elites and communal/religious elites plays in revolution mo-
bilization. This is a broader definition than ones normally used in the political science and political economy literature, which frequently
focus on federalism, administrative centralization, fiscal centralization, or democratic centralization (for example, see Rondinelli [1981]
or Manor [1999]). Any of these forms of centralization fit into the model espoused in this paper, although my focus is the costs imposed
by authorities, not the institutional structures themselves.
4Rubin (2012) suggests that the mechanism proposed in the present paper played a key role in the Reformation, as the printing press
facilitated the spread of the "shock" of Luther’s initial works, leading to a cascade of revolt.
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(as in Granovetter 1978; Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira 1985; Oliver and Marwell 1988; Marwell, Oliver, and
Prahl 1988; Macy 1991; Kuran 1995; Kim and Bearman 1997; Yin 1998; Callander 2007; Siegel 2009; Ellis
and Fender 2011).5 That is, they derive disutility when their actions differ from endogenously determined
social norms, which may arise from the importance individuals place on social identity (Akerlof and Kranton
2000, 2005), social custom and reputation (Akerlof 1980; Romer 1984; Kuran 1989, 1998; Naylor 1990;
Gould 1993; Kuran and Sunstein 1999), or status and conformity (Fershtman and Weiss 1993; Bernheim
1994; Fershtman, Murphy, and Weiss 1996; Akerlof 1997; Kuran and Sandholm 2008).
This setup entails that highly-centralized authorities - those with coercive power over more than one type
of sanction - are more insulated from pressures for change when exogenous shocks are small. There is less
incentive for citizens to violate the dictates of highly-centralized authorities, as they incur more than one type
of sanction from doing so. In turn, equilibrium actions remain stable.
However, this logic also entails that citizens are more likely to stay silent (i.e., not protest) when authority
is highly centralized. Hence, massive changes in equilibrium actions are more likely to result in centralized
regimes when a sufficiently large shock occurs. When a small portion of society transgresses the law (or norm,
or custom, etc.), a cascade to a vastly new equilibrium can arise when the actions of these citizens encourages
more citizens to transgress the law, which encourages even more to evade the law, and so on. This occurs to a
lesser extent when authority is less centralized, as authorities are more likely to accommodate the actions of
the citizenry, and preferences are therefore less likely to be falsified prior to the shock. Hence cascades are
less severe (if they occur at all) in more decentralized economies.
In other words, this is a tipping point model. When shocks are small, centralized authorities are more
insulated from change. However, when shocks are larger than the tipping point, equilibrium changes are larger
in economies with highly-centralized authorities.6 One implication of this hypothesis is that institutional
authorities with centralized, multi-lateral coercive power may seem insulated from upheaval when in fact they
are quite vulnerable. Because of this underlying vulnerability, authorities in such societies often do anything
to suppress large shocks - or communication about large shocks - such as suppressing and controlling media
5This differs from the standard economic framework put forth by Olson (1971) and Tullock (1971), where individuals maximize their
own utility independent of others. This property permits Olson and Tullock to suggest that collective action is difficult to sustain in large
groups, but their observation is contradicted numerous times in the historical record.
6Yin (1998) makes a similar point relating shock level to protest scale, but is more concerned with threshold distribution than the interac-
tion between protesters and authorities.
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and harshly combating dissent. This can explain, for example, the extreme measures taken to suppress the
internet in Iran and China. Such tactics work well to suppress small shocks. However, this also works to
further push the actions of the citizenry away from their intrinsic preferences, which may eventually cause
a larger cascade and thus unintentionally sow the seeds of the authority’s demise. Although this paper is
not meant to be predictive,7 it has significant implications for the fate of future of contemporary centralized
regimes (e.g., Syria, Zimbabwe, North Korea) following systemic shocks such as major changes in the price
of oil or grain or a natural disaster.8
This paper relates to the large economic, sociological, and political science literature in revolutions.9
The present paper is not meant to accept or deny the validity of any of these arguments, but instead offers a
complementary hypothesis. I do not account for the organizations or leadership that are often instrumental
to revolutionary activity (or even civil war, as in Besley and Persson [2011]), but instead provide a mapping
from broad institutional structure to massive social, political, and economic change.
Historical examples of massive and unexpected changes occurring in centralized regimes include the fall
of the Libyan, Egyptian, and Tunisian governments in the Arab Spring of 2011, the Iranian Revolution of
1979, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Taiping Rebellion in China (1850-1864), the fall of Iron Curtain
governments, the Protestant Reformation, and many others.10 In this paper, I employ the insights of the
model to analyze the numerous austerity protests which occurred in the developing world since the 1970s.
An econometric analysis of these protests from 1976-1992 suggests that protests were more severe under
7The model could certainly be employed in a predictive manner similar to Bueno de Mesquita (2009). This would require calibration of
the model’s parameters and is outside the scope of this paper.
8It may also be true that the type of policies taken by centralized governments exacerbate shocks to a greater extent than non-centralized
governments (for a recent example, see Meng, Qian, and Yared [2010]; for more on centralization and distribution of public goods, see
Lockwood [2002], Besley and Coate [2003], and Faguet [2004]). Where this is the case, the implications of the model for centralized
governments are even greater.
9The mechanism underlying revolutionary activity in the present paper is closest to Kuran (1989, 1995a, 1995b), who analyzes the
implications of public revelations of private preferences. For overviews of the social analysis of revolutions, see Tanter and Midlarsky
(1967), Shugart (1989), and Goldstone (1994, 2001).
10For more on the broad effects of the centralization of coercive power throughout world history, see Greif (2005). Iyigun (2009) argues
that there is a positive connection between monotheism and the length and bredth of dynastic power, as monotheistic religions have
generally been complementary to centralized government (due to high fixed costs of starting a monotheistic religion). This argument is
consistent with the one made in the present paper.
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decentralized authorities if they followed small shocks (proxied by indices of IMF involvement), but were
more severe under centralized authorities if they followed large shocks.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Consider a one-period game with perfect information. There are M + 2 players (where M is large): M
heterogeneous citizens and two institutional (social, political, economic, legal, or religious) authorities, a
central authority (C) and a non-central authority (N ).11 The institutional authorities choose from a continuous
set of actions which the citizens can publicly accept or reject. The model analyzes situations in which the
preferences of some citizens exogenously differ from those of the authorities, so actions could represent
varying levels of freedom of speech, press, or religion, publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the government
or religious authorities, or public opinion on social issues. The questions that the model sheds light on are,
"Under what conditions do small shocks lead to a massive increase in protest by citizens?" and "How is the
severity of protest affected by the centralization of authority?"
The period has three stages. In the first stage, the central authority chooses an action aC 2 [0; 1]. In
the second stage, the non-central authority chooses an action aN 2 [0; 1]. The third stage has numerous
substages. First, citizens choose whether to publicly accept (aj = 0) or reject (aj = 1) C’s action. Then,
a shock is realized where fraction  2 (0; 1) of those choosing to accept in the first stage are encouraged
to publicly reject for one subperiod. The shock can be interpreted as an event which momentarily reduces
the perceived costs or increases the benefits of publicly rejecting C (such as neighboring polities erupting
in protest). Meanwhile, all other citizens again choose to accept or reject C. More substages follow, with
citizens choosing to accept or rejectC in each substage until an equilibrium is reached and the game is over.12
This specification is chosen to highlight the idea that social connectivity can lead to rapid equilibrium change;
for example, protests in Egypt during the Arab Spring grew exponentially as more and more citizens revealed
their previously hidden preferences.
Each citizen j derives utility from choosing actions, aj 2 f0; 1g, where the citizen publicly accepts C’s
11The inclusion of only two authorities allows for tractability. The intuition underlying the main results of the model holds in more realistic
situations including numerous types of authorities.
12Formally, an equilibrium is reached when each citizen has no incentive to change actions between substages.
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dictates if aj = 0 and rejects them if aj = 1. Citizens derive greater utility from rejecting C’s dictates when
their own intrinsic "bliss point", bj , is further away from zero. Each citizen is randomly assigned a bliss point
from a normal distribution with mean  and variance 2.13 The citizens’ utilities are interdependent; that is,
they derive more utility by choosing actions that others choose.14 Citizens observe how many other citizens
rejected C (chose aj = 1) in the previous substage and expect the same number of citizens to reject C in the
current substage. If the citizens choose to publicly reject the authorities’ dictates, they also incur costs which
are a function of the actions of the institutional authorities, aC and aN . These costs are increasing in the size
of the violation (as in Romer [1984], Iannaccone [1988], Bernheim [1994], Kuran [1987, 1995a], Akerlof
[1997], Kuran and Sandholm [2008], Rubin [2011]) and represent the costs (or punishments) associated with
publicly breaking a religious dictate, breaking a law, violating a political norm, and the like, depending on
the type of authority in question.
Citizen j’s preferences are described in each period by the following utility function:
Uj = I faj = 0g
"
 m1 (aj   bj)2 +m2 1
M   1
P
i 6=j
I fai = 0g
#
+ (1)
I faj = 1g
"
 m1 (aj   bj)2 +m2 1
M   1
P
i 6=j
I fai = 1g  m3
 
aj   aN
 m4  aj   aC#
where m1, m2, m3, and m4 are weighting parameters greater than zero and I fg is an indicator function.
The non-central authority, N , is not directly affected by the actions of the citizenry - citizens revolt
against C, not N . Instead, N weighs the intrinsic benefits of its action against the costs that C can impose
for choosing actions contrary to C’s desires. N can therefore be thought of as a legitimizing agent of C (e.g.,
a religious authority legitimizing an autocrat or a legal authority legitimizing elected officials).
For simplicity, I assume that the actions of the citizenry do not enter N ’s utility function. While N ’s
actions do affect the citizenry, and the citizens’ actions indirectly affect N ’s utility (through their effect on
13Normality is not a necessary feature of the analysis. Any type of distribution with two inflection points with provide similar results. If
there is a rightward skew in the distribution (which is to be expected, since there is a fatter tail of citizens in opposition to the central
authority in most oppressive regimes), then the results hold over a larger portion of the parameter space than is considered in this paper.
14This interdependence captures the influence of social norms which may arise from the importance individuals place on social identity,
social custom, reputation, status, or conformity. This specification assumes that individuals derive utility from conforming. Gintis (2003)
suggests that "pro-social" behavior may be biologically determined, as humans improved their biological "fitness" by internalizing
cultural norms. Also see Greif (2010) and Greif and Tadelis (2010).
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C), this assumption is justified if we consider the cost imposed byC as the salient one affectingN ’s actions.15
Instead, N derives utility from choosing actions close to its intrinsic bliss point, bN 2 (0; ), and it faces a
cost from choosing actions which differ from the central authority, C. The upper bound  indicates that it has
a stronger preference for no protests occurring than the average citizen. N ’s preferences can be described as
follows:
UNt =  n1
 
bN   aN2     aN   aC2 ; (2)
where n1 is a weighting parameter greater than zero.   0 is the primary exogenous parameter of concern
in the model. It denotes the degree to which the non-central authority incurs a cost from diverging from the
action of the central authority.16 Although there are certainly endogenous elements to  in reality - the degree
to which one authority incurs costs from diverging from the other could be a function of the degree to which
the citizens abide by its dictates - endogenizing this key variable unnecessarily complicates the model. This
paper concentrates on massive equilibrium changes over a short period and how such changes arise rapidly.
Broader institutional changes which endogenously effect the level of centralization may follow in the long
run due to the interactions described in the model, but should not be affected in the short run by the rapid,
massive change which is at the heart of this model.17
The centralization parameter enters N ’s utility as a scalar which affects the cost N incurs for choosing
an action different from C. At  = 0, there is no such cost, at  !1 there is an infinite cost (if aN 6= aC),
and at  2 (0;1) there is a positive cost that is increasing in . While it is possible (in reality, but not in the
model) that C may also face costs from not conforming to N , the assumption of unidirectional centralization
of coercive power allows for tractability.18 It follows from this setup that at  ! 1, the two authorities are
ostensibly the same actor: power over numerous dimensions is centralized in one authority (C). At large ,
C has significant but not unlimited power over varying types of sanctions.
15This assumption is tantamount to having  be large relative to m3. Even when  is small, the effect of N ’s actions on C are of less
relevance, since the cost imposed by C is small.
16For more on the centralization of coercive power, see Greif (2005) and Karaman (2009).
17Moreover, Rubin (2011) shows in a similar model that under a basic set of circumstances, endogenizing the degree of centralization
merely exacerbates the effects seen under an exogenous parameterization, as the feedback between players is more enhanced.
18In fact, the model can be interpreted as one of relative centralization, where  is the cost incurred by N for not following C’s actions
relative to the reverse situation (where C incurs costs). All that is needed for the results to hold is for N to have a greater cost than C.
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The central authority, C, derives utility from choosing actions close to its bliss point, bC 2  0; bN.
The upper bound bN indicates that it has a stronger preference for no protests occurring than N . C wishes
to minimize the average number of citizens who reject its dictates.19 C’s preferences can be described as
follows:
UC =  c1
 
aC   bC2   1
M
P
i
I fai = 1g (3)
where c1 is a weighting parameter greater than zero.
2.2 Solving the Model
2.2.1 Equilibrium Actions: Citizens and N
The model is solved using backwards induction. Equilibrium actions are denoted with superscript * and the
Nash equilibrium concept is employed.
I first solve for the equilibrium actions of the citizenry. A little algebra indicates that citizen j chooses to
publicly accept C’s dictates (aj = 0) when:
bj  1
2m1
"
m1  m2
 
1  2
M   1
P
i 6=j
I fai = 0g
!
+m3
 
1  aN+m4  1  aC# . (4)
In equilibrium, some citizen has the largest bliss point, denoted b, of all of the citizens choosing aj = 0.
If an interior solution exists and there are enough citizens so that the law of large numbers is realized, then
(denoting F () as the normal cdf with mean  and standard deviation 2):
b =
m2
m1
F (b) +
1
2m1

m1  m2 +m3
 
1  aN+m4  1  aC . (5)
Next, solve for the optimal action of N . Its first-order condition provides the result:
aN =
n1b
N + aC
n1 + 
. (6)
19This is an indirect utility specification. We could think of C’s optimization problem as maximizing the probability of staying in power
while also having some optimal policy (bC ). Minimizing the number of citizens choosing aj = 1 is tantamount to maximizing the
probability of staying in power.
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Plugging (6) into (5) entails that b is implicitly defined by:
b =
m2
m1
F (b) +
1
2m1
"
m1  m2 +m3
n1
 
1  bN
n1 + 
+

m3

n1 + 
+m4
 
1  aC# . (7)
2.2.2 Multiple Equilibria
Consider the equilibrium level of protest for a given level of aC. Equation (7) indicates the possibility that
multiple equilibria exist. Indeed, since the distribution of bliss points is normally distributed, the right-hand
side of (7) takes on the familiar S-shape seen in Figure 1. This figure (in a manner similar to Granovetter
[1978] and Kuran [1995]) maps the highest bliss point of all citizens choosing aj = 0 on the horizontal axis
and the right-hand side of (7) on the vertical axis. When more citizens choose aj = 1, there is a leftward
movement along the curve. An equilibrium exists (solving (7)) where the curve crosses the 45-degree line.
Figure 1: Three Equilibria
RHS of (7)
b1 X b2 Y b3
Highest bliss point of all citizens choosing a j = 0
E1
E2
E3
The S-shaped curve in Figure 1 has many important features. The first is that it crosses the 45-degree line
three times only if its slope is greater than one at middle of the curve (bliss point ). It is straight-forward
to see that the slope is greater than one at  if the standard deviation () is sufficiently small (meaning
that citizens are more tightly bunched around ). We will assume that  is sufficiently small so that three
equilibria exist for the rest of the analysis; it is precisely under this circumstance that preferences are most
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interconnected (since most citizens are similar to each other), and this is the case that we are interested in.20
Moreover, Figure 1 shows that 3 equilibria can exist: E1, E2, and E3. E3 is a "good" equilibrium from the
central authority’s perspective, since more citizens choose aj = 0, while E1 is a "bad" equilibrium. For
the rest of the analysis, assume that the pre-shock equilibrium is E3. After all, we are interested in situations
where massive anti-authority movements emerge on what were quiet streets. We can interpret E3 as the "quiet
streets" equilibrium, since most of the population publicly accepts C’s dictates despite privately disagreeing
with C. In sum, assume the following:
Assumption 1: There are three possible equilibria prior to the shock for any value of aC 2 0; bC.
Assumption 2: Prior to the shock, the equilibrium that emerges is the one with the most citizens choosing
aj = 0 (Equilibrium E3 in Figure 1).
E1 and E3 are stable (or, in game theoretic terms, trembling hand perfect), while E2 is not. To see this,
note that any point at which the curve is above the 45-degree line, such as bliss point Y in Figure 1, is one
in which LHS<RHS of (7). Inequality (4) indicates that for citizens with bliss point between Y and b3, the
optimal action is aj = 0. Hence, the citizen with bliss point Y cannot have the largest bliss point of all
citizens choosing aj = 0 in equilibrium; if it chooses aj = 0, citizens with bliss points between Y and b3
also have incentive to choose aj = 0. This means that at equilibrium E3, if a small amount of citizens deviate
(say, after the shock) and choose aj = 1, the equilibrium will converge back to E3. Conversely, this means
that at equilibrium E2, if even one citizen deviates and chooses aj = 0, the equilibrium will move to E3.
Likewise, at any point in which the curve is below the 45-degree line, such as bliss point X, LHS>RHS of
(7). Inequality (4) indicates that at any bliss point between b1 and X, the optimal action is aj = 1. A similar
logic to that espoused above indicates that if some citizens deviate from E1 to choose aj = 0, the equilibrium
will converge back to E1. Conversely, this means that at equilibrium E2, if even one citizen deviates and
chooses aj = 1, the equilibrium will move to E1.
This logic entails that equilibria E1 and E3 are stable - if a small group of citizens change their actions
(after the shock), the old equilibrium quickly re-emerges. On the other hand, it only takes one citizen de-
viating from E2 for a new equilibrium to emerge. But just how stable are these equilibria, and under what
20Moreover, three equilibria can only exist when  is not too small or two large. If  is too small, the S-shape arches upward prior to
reaching the 45-degree line, and the two cross only once (at the top of the S). If  is too large, the S-shape flattens out at its top prior
to reaching the 45-degree line, and the two cross only once (at the bottom of the S). The formal conditions under which three equilibria
exist are available upon request.
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conditions will a cascade from E3 to E1 emerge? It can be seen in Figure 1 that at equilibrium E3, if all of the
citizens (plus one) with bliss points between b2 and b3 change their actions from public acceptance (aj = 0)
to public rejection (aj = 1) of the central authority, E1 will emerge as the equilibrium outcome. All of the
citizens with bliss points between b1 and b2 join the cascade to the new equilibrium. In other words, b2 is the
threshold bliss point - if citizens below bliss point b2 choose aj = 1, E1 will emerge, while E3 will emerge
if citizens above b2 choose aj = 0.
Within the context of the model, this means that the shock may not end up affecting equilibrium actions at
all. If the pre-shock equilibrium is E3 and  < F (b3) F (b2), then not enough citizens publicly disapprove
after the shock (choose aj = 1) to move the equilibrium to E1. Instead, the equilibrium moves back to E3,
and all those who were affected by the shock go back to publicly accepting C’s dictates (aj = 1). This
could occur if some people take to the streets, but upon doing so realize that public support for their cause
is not as great as they expected, and hence go back inside and publicly abide by C’s dictates. On the other
hand, when the shock is sufficiently large ( > F (b3)   F (b2)), the initial equilibrium unravels and the
post-shock equilibrium is E1. In this case, enough people take to the streets after the shock that more people
are encouraged to do so (since preferences are interconnected), which encourages more to do so, and so on
until 1  F (b1) citizens publicly reject C.
2.2.3 Cascades and Centralization
In the model, there are two ways in which an economy can move from E3 to E1 after a shock. First, if nearly
all citizens are affected by the shock ( is large), then most citizens publicly protest and eventually E1 arises.
This is a trivial result - it merely indicates that a large shock which encourages nearly everyone to change
actions will change the equilibrium outcome. The second manner in which an economy moves from E3 to E1
is less obvious. This occurs when cascades of public dissent encourage individuals to reveal their preferences
after seeing others do so. Cascades can arise when a small portion of the population is affected by the shock
because the interconnectedness of preferences spreads the shock to much of the population. I focus on these
outcomes for the rest of the paper; that is, I focus on cases of preference revelation rather than preference
change. After all, it is under these conditions that seemingly quiet streets can erupt in protest after relatively
small events trigger the spread of dissent.
To this end, I define a cascade as occurring when more people who are not directly affected by the shock
switch actions (from public acceptance to rejection) than those who are directly affected by the shock. Using
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the nomenclature from Figure 1, I formally define a cascade as follows:
Definition 1 A cascade occurs if:
i) F (b3)  F (b2) < : More than the threshold number of citizens change their actions after the shock,
entailing that the equilibrium changes from E3 to E1.
ii) F (b3)  F (b2) < F (b2)  F (b1): the shock can directly affect less than half of the citizens but still
precipitate an equilibrium change from E3 to E1.
The main purpose of the model is to highlight the relationship between centralization and cascades. To
this end, note from (7) that changes in the centralization parameter () or the central authority’s action (aC)
merely shift the curve in Figure 1. The curve shifts down as aC increases and shifts up as  increases (since
aC < bN ).21 Hence, the first question that the model can answer is "under which conditions (with respect
to ) does a ’good’ equilibrium (E3) emerge after the shock?"
Consider the following intuition. In high- economies, citizens falsify their preferences to a greater
extent. Hence, fewer citizens publicly reject C (choose aj = 1) since preferences are interconnected. This
entails that the bliss point of the "threshold citizen" (b2 in Figure 1) is further away from b3 as  increases,
and a greater shock is necessary to pass the threshold. Therefore, the range of shock size () over which the
economy stays at the pre-shock equilibrium (E3) after the shock is weakly increasing in centralization (), as
noted in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The parameter space over which the pre-shock equilibrium (E3) also emerges after the shock
is weakly increasing in , ceteris paribus.
This result indicates that highly centralized economies are more insulated against public rejection of the
central authority. However, in the event that a shock does trigger a cascade, it is worth asking: how severe
will the change in actions be after the shock? The following definition is useful in formalizing this analysis:
Definition 2 The cascade magnitude is the number of citizens who change actions from publicly accepting
C prior to the shock to publicly rejecting C after the shock.
21Since it is assumed that there are 3 equilibria for all values of aC, the analysis does not focus on C’s decision. C simply chooses
some aC to balance the marginal deviation from its bliss point with the marginal increase in citizens choosing aj = 0. C’s choice is
monotonic in , so we do not need to explictly solve for it to attain comparative statics.
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I focus on the cases where cascades (as defined above) can occur. I ignore cases where movements from
E3 to E1 only occur when shocks affect most of the population. This is not very interesting economically - it
is a trivial result that big changes happen after big shocks.
Cascades can only arise when most citizens "disagree" with C.22 I focus on this case ( >  for some
 defined in the proof of Proposition 2), which often arises in autocratic regimes when the interests of the
autocrat and the citizens are not aligned. Indeed, it is in these situations where revolutions occur; when a
cascade occurs in a regime where the citizens disagree with the central authority, the change in expressed
preferences is much greater than in a regime where most citizens agree with the central authority (as is
suggested in Proposition 2).
It was noted in Proposition 1 that centralized authorities are better able to suppress dissent and are thus
more insulated from small shocks. Since centralized authorities can impose multiple sanctions on dissent,
citizens are less likely to publicly reject C despite disagreeing with its dictate. This enables a situation where
citizens "falsify their preferences" to a greater degree in centralized regimes. That is, citizens under central-
ized rule are more likely to disagree with C but not publicly reject C. Kuran (1995a, p. 3) defines preference
falsification as "the act of misrepresenting one’s genuine wants under perceived social pressures." When cit-
izens falsify their preferences, they choose actions which differ from their bliss point for two reasons. First,
perceived social pressures encourage them to choose actions similar to those chosen by others. Secondly, this
outcome is exacerbated when institutional sanctions are severe (m3 and m4 are large) and the actions of the
authorities diverge from the bliss point of the citizenry.
The major upshot of increased preference falsification is that if a sufficiently large shock does occur (i.e.,
one that is large enough that at least the threshold citizen changes actions), the cascade magnitude is larger the
more centralized the regime is. After a larger shock, larger cascades are more likely to occur where citizens
are falsifying their preferences to a greater extent; once some citizens act closer to their internal preferences
by publicly rejecting C (choosing aj = 1), others will find it more attractive to publicly reject C, especially
since they disagreed with C in the first place. Since there are more citizens who privately disagree with
22On the other hand, when  is sufficiently small, there are two possible outcomes. The first is that citizens agree with C to such an
extent that only the "good" equilibrium (E3) emerges, and few citizens publicly dissent. The second outcome is that multiple equilibria
exist, but the difference between F (b3) and F (b2) is greater than the difference between F (b2) and F (b1). This is the relatively
uninteresting case noted above where an equilibrium change from E3 to E1 can happen, but only when most of the people who change
actions are directly affected by the shock.
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C in centralized regimes, this information revelation mechanism is stronger. This logic is summarized in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If a cascade arises, the cascade magnitude is weakly increasing in , ceteris paribus.
When the citizens’ bliss points are far away from the actions of C ( is large, as it is in this case), larger
cascades occur under highly centralized rule following shocks. Although highly centralized authorities are
more insulated from small shocks, citizens are relatively unhappy. This means that when a shock is large
enough that some citizens publicly reject C, the cost to publicly rejecting C decreases, encouraging more
citizens to publicly reject C, and so on. Relative to the pre-shock state - which may often seem tranquil -
centralized regimes are subject to massive changes in public opinion despite having the appearance of public
acceptance.
2.3 Discussion
The intuition formalized in Proposition 2 offers two explanations for why seemingly tranquil, centralized
societies can quickly undergo massive changes, especially when the centralized authority promotes policies
that are detrimental to most citizens ( differs substantially from aC). One explanation, which is also offered
by Granovetter (1978) and Kuran (1989, 1995a, 1995b), is that preference falsification can encourage latent
movements in social norms to emerge after a shock. That is, an economic, political, or social shock may
move equilibrium actions by enough to encourage most citizens, even those who are not directly affected by
the shock, to choose drastically different actions.
The other explanation, which is novel to this paper, sheds light on the role that institutional structures
play in determining the effects of shocks. It suggests that a high degree of centralization of coercive power
discourages marginal changes to equilibrium actions after small shocks. Citizens have less incentive to pub-
licly dissent, as they incur two institutional costs from doing so. The same citizens may be more encouraged
to publicly dissent in less centralized societies, however, as they face less cost from doing so and the au-
thorities (especially the non-central authority) react by changing their actions to a greater extent. This is
why, as Proposition 1 notes, equilibria where there is little public dissent are more likely to emerge in highly
centralized economies following a shock. Yet, when larger shocks materialize, large cascades towards vastly
different equilibria are more likely to result in highly centralized economies. This occurs because citizens
falsify their preferences to a greater extent in such economies, and thus large shocks encourage some citizens
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to change their actions, in turn making it more likely that the institutional laws will be much different in the
post-shock equilibrium.
Kuran (1995a, 1995b) and Yin (1998) do suggest that unanticipated regime change is more likely to occur
in politically repressive countries. Their hypotheses coincide with the one made in the present paper, though
it is not clear that their hypotheses hold when other types of freedoms (religious, economic, legal) exist in
politically repressive regimes. The essential difference between the present hypothesis and Kuran’s and Yin’s
is that I stress the interdependence of institutions that are able to impose different types of sanctions. This
leads to a similar conclusion as Kuran and Yin, as such institutional structures are often found in politically
repressive regimes.
The model also sheds light on the connection between institutional centralization and revolutions. Numer-
ous definitions for revolution exist in scholarly works.23 For example, Goldstone (2001) defines revolution
as "an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, ac-
companied by formal or informal mass mobilization and non-institutionalized actions that undermine existing
authorities." Kuran (1989, 1995a) broadly defines a revolution as a discontinuous change in public opinion or
social order and Davies (1962) defines revolutions as "violent civil disturbances that cause the displacement
of one ruling group by another that has a broader popular basis for support."
The model suggests that revolutions (i.e., large movements from E3 to E1) may occur in centralized
regimes after a shock only when the shock is sufficiently large; on the other hand, smaller shocks are more
easily repressed in centralized regimes. "Shock" is a somewhat ambiguous term, but the literature on rev-
olutions provides numerous types of shocks that could precipitate revolutions, such as sharp reversals in
economic fortunes (Davies 1962; Tanter and Midlarsky 1967), rapid economic growth (Olson 1963), defeat
in war, or sustained population growth (Goldstone 2001).
In sum, the following testable predictions arise from this framework:
 Equilibria where little public dissent exists are more likely to arise in highly centralized economies.
 If a shock is large enough to cause a cascade, the change in pre- and post-shock actions is greater in
more highly centralized economies.
23There is a large literature merely attempting to define the term revolution. I have no desire to enter this debate, summarized nicely by
Goldstone (2001), and instead note that revolutions are an extreme form of massive equilibrium change.
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3 Austerity Riots and Centralization
A primary implication of the model is that countries with centralized authorities are more insulated from
change when shocks are small but are more susceptible to sudden, massive changes when shocks are large.
In this section, I test the hypothesis by analyzing the severity of austerity protests in the developing world
between 1976 and 1992. Such protests were common in the developing world beginning in the mid-1970s in
reaction to measures employed - almost always as a condition of IMF aid - to combat inflation and government
debt.24 I test the relationship between a series of "IMF pressure" variables and severity of protests over
differing degrees of institutional centralization to shed light on the relationships espoused in the model.
Although the data cannot speak to the microeconomic mechanisms highlighted in the model (namely, those
related to internal and expressed preferences and cascades), it can shed light on the connections between
macroeconomic events, institutional structures, and changes in publicly expressed opinions. This analysis
underscores the determinants of protest severity (a macro concept) as well as sudden equilibrium changes (a
micro concept), since the latter is realized in the former.
Modern austerity protests began in the mid-1970s, with the first one occurring in Peru in 1976. The
protests were sparked by austerity measures which were almost always imposed by the IMF as a condition of
assistance. The stated aims of these measures were freeing up markets and cutting government spending in
order to reduce government debt and curb massive inflation. These market-based measures, known by some
as “shock treatment”, included currency devaluation, broad reduction of spending on the public sector, priva-
tization of state-owned corporations, cuts in public subsidies for food and basic necessities, wage restraints,
higher interest rates, and elimination of protectionism (Walton and Seddon 1994).25
These policies sparked protests in many places where they were imposed. Such protests were defined
by Walton and Seddon (1994) as “large scale collective actions including political demonstrations, general
strikes, and riots, which are animated by grievances over state policies of economic liberalization imple-
mented in response to the debt crisis and market reforms urged by international agencies.” The international
agency most associated with these protests is the IMF, and hence Joseph Stiglitz called them “IMF riots”.
The distributional implications of these policies are clear – most policies negatively affected the urban
poor, at least in the short run (Walton and Ragin 1990; Walton and Seddon 1994). The protests were primarily
24The evolution of IMF conditionality, as well as arguments for and against conditionality, are summarized in Dreher (2004, 2009).
25For a scathing review of these policies in the developing world over the last half-century, see Klein (2007).
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urban in nature, often following a rise in a price for a specific good or an elimination of a subsidy. In some
cases, the protests were relegated to one city and remained non-violent, such as organized strikes planned in
Ecuador and Bolivia (Walton and Ragin 1990). On the other extreme, protests turned into deadly riots which
spread throughout the country, as was the case of the Venezuelan protest of 1989, where a week of rioting
spread from Caracas to 16 other cities.
What determined the differences in severity of these protests? This topic has received some attention from
sociologists and political scientists, who have proposed a wide range of explanations. Walton and Seddon
(1994) and Walton and Ragin (1990) provide evidence that over-urbanization plays a key role in both the
presence and severity of the riots. They suggest that the linkage between the two lies in the development of
organizational infrastructure capable of mobilizing political action. Walton and Ragin (1990) also suggest
that IMF pressure significantly affects protest severity but inflation and debt do not.26
In this section, I analyze how changes in IMF involvement affected the likelihood of severe protest in a
country. When IMF pressure is present, pressures to liberalize markets generally ensue - and protests may
follow. Propositions 1 and 2 of the model suggests that since austerity measures differ substantially from the
bliss point of most citizens ( is much different that aC), when IMF pressure (the "shock" in the model) is
small, centralized economies will better be able to suppress protests. However, significant IMF pressure is
more likely to precipitate massive changes in centralized economies. In other words, the following prediction
arises from the model:
Prediction 1: When there is a small amount of IMF pressure, austerity protests will on average be less
severe in countries with more centralized institutions, all else being equal. However, when there is a large
amount of IMF pressure, austerity protests will on average be more severe in countries with more centralized
institutions.
3.1 Data
Data were gathered on austerity protests covering the same years as Walton and Seddon (1994): 1976-1992.
The former date denotes the onset of the first modern austerity protest while the latter represents the time in
which Walton and Seddon went to press.
26On the other hand, Auvinen (1997) finds that poor economic performance (indicated by high inflation and large debt service) is associated
with political demonstrations, riots, and strikes.
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As noted by Walton and Ragin (1990), obtaining a complete list of debtor countries that experienced
international pressure to implement austerity measures can only be done indirectly, as the exact terms nego-
tiated between the IMF and debtor countries is kept secret. To this end, I employ three measures identified
by Walton and Ragin as indicative of IMF pressure: 1) the country employed the "extended fund facility"
(EFF), generally reserved for countries suffering a significant imbalance of payments relating to structural
maladjustments in production and trade (IMF [various]), in a given year between 1976 and 1992;27 2) the
country’s ratio of IMF funds used to its IMF quota exceeded 125% in a given year between 1976 and 1992;
3) the country rescheduled or renegotiated its debt in a given year between 1976 and 1992.28 70 countries
satisfied one of these three criteria between 1976 and 1992.29 I form a panel that is restricted to years in
which one of these criteria were satisfied in the country in question within one year (either before or after).
A list of these countries and the years employed in the data is available in Appendix Table A1.
40 countries in the data experienced austerity protests between 1976 and 1992. A Lexis-Nexis search of
news reports of the 70 countries listed in Table A1 (as well as any listed in Walton and Seddon [1994] that
were not in Table A1) from 1976-1992 produced 116 separate instances of austerity protest. Protests and
riots were only documented if they resulted from austerity measures or IMF pressure - other types of anti-
government protests or strikes are not included in the data. Planned general strikes and small, non-violent,
sector-specific strikes are also not included in the data (even if they resulted from austerity measures).30
27The IMF defines the extended fund facility as "an IMF lending facility established in 1974 to assist member countries in overcoming
balance of payments problems that stem largely from structural problems and require a longer period of adjustment than is possible under
a Stand-By Arrangement. A member requesting an Extended Arrangement outlines its objectives and policies for the whole period of
the arrangement (typically three years) and presents a detailed statement each year of the policies and measures it plans to pursue over
the next 12 months." (IMF)
28Walton and Ragin split the last category into two: debt rescheduling and debt renegotiation. My reading of the data suggests that the
line between these two is often blurred, so I have lumped them together. Data for EFF and IMF quota comes from various IMF Annual
Reports; data for IMF funds used comes from the World Development Indicators database; data for debt rescheduling and restructuring
comes from clubdeparis.org, Kuhn and Guzmàn (1990), and Dillon et al. (1985).
29Some countries were omitted from the dataset due to lack of IMF or control data. These include:Angola, Barbados, Burma, Dominica,
Equatorial Guinea, Grenada, Liberia, Somalia, Uganda, Western Samoa, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. Iran and South Korea did not satisfy
any of these conditions but are included in the data since there was an austerity protest in each country.
30All results are robust to inclusion of general strikes and industry-specific protests as severity 1 protests. These results are available in the
Appendix. General strikes are not included in the base results because the model is intended to analyze changes in individual behavior
(on a collective scale) resulting from shocks, not organized, institutionally-driven protests.
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I subjectively coded each of these protests by severity using the following criterion, which are discussed
further in Appendix B. An instance was scored 1 if it were a small (relative to population), confined (to one
or two cities) protest. An instance was scored 2 if it were either prolonged but confined or widespread but
not prolonged and 3 if the protest were prolonged and contained widespread riots. Only protests with both
of these characteristics were coded level 3. An example of a protest coded 3 occurred in Algeria in October
1988, when 159 protesters were killed in a few major Algerian cities over the span of week and thousands
were injured and arrested. The government’s response to the protests, including those which lead to deaths,
were not taken to account when creating the severity measures. Where government action occurred, the index
takes into account the reported events that the government was responding to, not the government response
itself. The reason for this is that it is possible that centralized governments are more likely to respond with
violence. Hence, including the government’s response would bias the severity index in favor of the proposed
hypothesis.
While coding these protests is an admittedly subjective process, a reading of the articles reporting on the
protests showed that most protests/riots easily fit into one of these three categories. The differences between
protests coded 1 and other protests are especially stark. The difference between protests coded 2 and 3 are less
obvious and thus more subjective, but this is not an issue in the analysis, since protests of these two severity
levels are always lumped together. I also create an alternative index, found in Appendix B, for protests in
which the severity level was not obvious. Table 1 shows the protests data broken down by continent.31
Region
Protests
Indexed 1
Protests
Indexed 2
Protests
Indexed 3
Total
Protests
Africa 9 9 3 21
Asia 10 0 1 11
Central America 16 8 1 25
Europe 7 0 2 9
Middle East 2 2 5 9
South America 17 23 1 41
Total 61 42 13 116
Table 1: Protests and Severity by Continent
The intuition outlined in the model indicates that a good proxy for institutional centralization is one that
accounts for one authority’s ability to affect numerous types of sanctions. One such variable is spelled out in
31Table A1 shows the protest data broken down by year and Table A3 shows the data broken down by country.
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the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2008): constraint on the executive. This variable is defined as:
The extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives,
whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability
groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability
groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monar-
chies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary.
This variable ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 equaling “Unlimited Authority” (no regular limitations on the
executive’s actions) and 7 equaling “Executive Parity or Subordination” (accountability groups have effective
authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity). This variable provides an ideal proxy
for the degree of institutional centralization, as spelled out in the model, because it measures the degree to
which political authorities can extend multifarious sanctions.
A weaker proxy of centralization is the Freedom House (2009) "degree of political freedom" variable.
This variable ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 equaling "most free" and 7 equaling "least free". This is hardly
an ideal measure of centralization, as defined in the model, since it does not directly underscore the ability
of the central authority to impose numerous sanctions. However, centralized authorities generally also have
the ability to restrict political freedoms. Nowhere do I claim that centralization has to be the driving force
behind political freedom; I merely suggest that this is one way in which centralization manifests itself. For
these reasons, regressions using this variable should be regarded as robustness checks relative to the results
employing constraint on the executive data.
Other controls are employed to account for phenomena which political scientists, economists, and soci-
ologists consider as salient factors associated with protest activity. These include the urbanization rate, per
capita GDP, population, and a measure of religious fractionalization.32 The religious fractionalization index
is constructed like a Herfindahl index, equaling the sum of the proportion of each religion in the country
squared. The summary statistics of all controls are reported in Appendix Table A4.
32Data on urbanization, GDP, and population comes from World Bank (various). The measure of religious fractionalization is derived from
data found in Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001). The controls employed in these regressions are consistent with those pointed out by
Auvinen (1997) as ones that traditionally have received attention in the political science, economics, and sociology literature related to
political conflict. Inflation and government debt are not included as controls because they frequently lead to IMF involvement.
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3.2 Analysis
3.2.1 Testing for the Presence of Protest
The data provide a chance to test the model’s primary prediction: countries with centralized political author-
ities should have smaller changes (relative to countries with decentralized authorities) in expressed public
opinion (as seen in protests) when shocks are small, but larger changes when shocks are large. Yet, before we
can test how shocks (proxied with IMF variables) affect the severity of protests, we must establish whether
the proxies are good predictors of protest. In particular, the model suggests testing the following equation,
where Protestit is a dummy equaling 1 if there is a protest in country i in year t, X is the set of control vari-
ables, and "CP" denotes the "centralization proxy", where both the "constraint on the executive" and "political
freedom" variables are transformed so that higher values indicate greater centralization.
Protestit = 0 + 1Shockit + 2CPit + Xit + "it (8)
There are 3 different IMF variables that proxy for a shock: use of IMF funds, use of EFF funds, and
the number of restructurings and reschedulings. The first two variables are deflated by the country’s IMF
quota, which is based on its standing in the world’s economy. Walton and Ragin (1990) note that all three of
these variables are good predictors of austerity protests, with the number of restructurings being the strongest
predictor.33 I also create variables for the greatest single-year level of the three IMF proxies over the previous
two years. These latter variables may be more suitable, since the chain of events from IMF pressure to
implementation of austerity programs to protests can take months to matriculate and are thus often realized
over multiple years.
Regression equation (8) does not provide a test of the model’s hypothesis; instead, it provides a test of
how well the IMF variables proxy for a "shock" in the context of the model. The model indicates that the
coefficient on the IMF "shock" variable, 1, should be positive (and statistically significant). If it is not,
then the variable in question is not a predictor of protests in general and thus should shed little light on how
33Walton and Ragin formulate an "IMF pressure index" which is the summation of the z-scores of all 4 IMF indicators. I do not do this
for two reasons: 1) I find, like Walton and Ragin, that the number of restructurings and reschedulings is by far the best predictor; 2) the
sum of the z-scores is dominated by the restructuring variable, which is not normally distributed, and hence converting it to a z-score is
erroneous. I have analyzed the regressions reported in this paper using Walton and Ragin’s z-score variable and the results are similar -
though not as strong - as the ones reported here. These results are available upon request.
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institutional centralization affects the severity of protests.
A probit model is used to test equation (8). The probit coefficients are reported in Table 2.34 All re-
gressions include continent dummies, and standard errors are clustered by continent.35 The results indicate
that the "use of IMF funds" and "EFF" variables are not good predictors of protests, but the "restructur-
ing/rescheduling" variable is a good predictor. The coefficients on the IMF Pressure Index are statistically
insignificant in all of the regressions where "use of IMF funds" and "EFF" variables are employed as the
shock proxy and all other controls are included. However, the number of restructurings or reschedulings
appears to be a strong predictor of protests (the coefficient is always positive and statistically significant), a
result also found in Walton and Ragin (1990). Hence, for the remainder of the analysis I will only employ
reschedulings - not use of IMF funds or EFF - as a proxy for an IMF "shock".
3.2.2 Relating Centralization and Protest Severity
Since the rescheduling variable is a good predictor of protests, we can re-write Prediction 1 as the following:
Prediction 1A: All else being equal, a change to a more centralized economy should have a positive (negative)
effect on the probability of a more severe protest occurring when the restructuring variable is large (small)
As in the model, Prediction 1A suggests that there is a non-linear relationship between centralization and
the severity of protests. This relationship can be estimated with the regression model in equation (9). The
dependent variable, Protest Severityit, equals one if the most severe protest in country i and year t equals
2 or 3 and equals zero otherwise. Unfortunately, there are too few observations of protests of severity 3 to
test the model using a dependent variable which equals one only if the protest is of severity 3.36 This should
not detract from the results, however, as the most significant differences in protest severity are between
those coded 1, which are generally confined and short, and 2 and 3, which are more widespread and long in
duration. As before, "CP" denotes the centralization proxy (either the constraint on the executive or political
34Table A5 reports regressions where the IMF variables are taken over two years. Results are very similar to Table 2.
35Including country dummies would be ideal, but there is too little variation within countries over time for this to be a feasible approach,
as all results are dependent on a small number of observations. Using non-clustered standard errors gives largely similar results, which
are available upon request.
36Nevertheless, the results are broadly robust (in terms of statistical significance) to an ordered probit specification.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Use of Funds/Quota (if > 1.25) -0.000 0.018 0.021
(0.089) (0.092) (0.091)
Extended Fund Facility/Quota 0.075*** 0.037 0.033
(0.027) (0.036) (0.037)
# of reschedulings/restructurings 0.389*** 0.304*** 0.303***
(0.099) (0.108) (0.110)
Constraint on Executive -0.020 -0.020 -0.022
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Political Rights -0.041** -0.037 -0.041
(0.018) (0.024) (0.025)
Urbanization Rate 0.913 0.877 0.870 0.838 0.698 0.656
(1.153) (1.134) (1.154) (1.138) (1.025) (1.000)
Log of Real GDP -0.188 -0.193 -0.180 -0.184 -0.180 -0.183
(0.128) (0.141) (0.122) (0.137) (0.111) (0.126)
Religious Fractionalization 0.656 0.630 0.648 0.622 0.600 0.568
(0.640) (0.644) (0.670) (0.672) (0.645) (0.654)
Log of Population 0.195** 0.193** 0.190** 0.188** 0.188** 0.185**
(0.087) (0.085) (0.084) (0.082) (0.086) (0.084)
Number of Previous Protests 0.038** 0.039** 0.039** 0.040** 0.044** 0.046***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
Continent Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 805 801 801 807 803 803 807 803 803
pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.108 0.109 0.006 0.109 0.110 0.026 0.122 0.123
Table 2: Protest Presence (Probit Coefficients)
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant  term included in each regression
Dependent Variable: Protest Presence (0/1)
rights variable), while the shock variable is the number of reschedulings (over one or two years).37
Protest Severityit = 0 + 1Shockit + 2CPit + 3Shockit * CPit + Xit + "it (9)
Prediction 1A implies that 2 should be negative and 3 should be positive. In other words, protest severity
37There is the possibility that the regressions specified above suffer from an endogeneity problem. That is, it is possible that more
centralized regimes are more (or less) able to access IMF funds and impose austerity. If this is true, the "shock" variable (rescheduling)
is a function of the centralization proxy, and the regression model is misspecified. Moreover, Kohlscheen (2010) and van Rijckeghem
and Weder (2009) find a negative relationship between constraints on the executive power (the centralization proxy) and sovereign debt
default (which is related to IMF conditionality). However, the correlations between the shock variables and the centralization proxies
are almost 0. Amongst the observations used in the regressions, RESC;CE =  0:0186; RESC;PR =  0:0741, where RESC
is the rescheduling variable, CE is the "Constraint on the Executive" variable, and PR is the "Political Rights" variable. Moreover,
regressions with the rescheduling variables as the dependent variables and the centralization proxies and other controls on the right-hand
side provides highly insignificant results on the centralization proxy coefficients. These results are available upon request.
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should be decreasing in centralization when shocks are small (and hence the interaction term is small), while
protest severity should be increasing in centralization when shocks are large. These predictions are mostly
confirmed in Table 3, which reports the probit coefficients of an estimation of equation (9).
The coefficient on the centralization proxies (2) is negative in columns (2)-(4), though it is never statis-
tically significant, while the coefficient on the interaction term is positive in all regressions and is statistically
significant in columns (2)-(4). A much more instructive look is provided by Tables 4 and 5, which map the
probability of a severe protest occurring over varying amounts of reschedulings and values of the centraliza-
tion parameter. Again, the constraint on the executive has been transformed so that a value of 7 is the most
centralized (least constraint) and the value of 1 is the least centralized (most constraint). These probabilities
were derived using the coefficients in Table 3, taken at the average of the control variables.38
A number of patterns emerge from these tables. First, in the lower panel of Table 4 and in both panels of
Table 5, severe protests are less likely to occur as centralization increases when there are zero reschedulings.
Although the last column suggests that this trend is not statistically significant, this is in line with what the
model predicts: centralized regimes are more able to suppress dissent when shocks are weak or non-existent.
It is not surprising that this result is not statistically significant - if there is no evidence of a shock, we
would not expect a severe protest to occur in any economy, centralized or not. These comparative statics
reverse, however, when reschedulings occur. In all four panels of Tables 4 and 5, the probability of severe
protest is increasing in centralization when a rescheduling occurs, with the trend being stronger when multiple
reschedulings occur. This trend is statistically significant in 5 of the 8 specifications. This result is consistent
with the model: although centralized regimes are good at suppressing small shocks, they are susceptible to
massive changes when larger shocks occur. Indeed, the probability of a severe protest occurring in the most
centralized regimes is more than double that of the least centralized regimes in 5 of the 8 specifications where
at least one rescheduling occurs.
In sum, this empirical exercise is meant merely to support the theoretical contribution of the model.
Although the analysis does not speak to the micro mechanisms suggested in the model, it does confirm its
testable predictions. Most importantly, it provides evidence that centralized authorities are able to suppress
changes in publicly-expressed opinion when shocks are small, but are susceptible to massive changes in
publicly-expressed opinion when shocks are large.
38The Africa dummy is set equal to 1 and all other continent dummies set equal to 0. The results are robust to setting other continent
dummies equal to 1.
24
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of reschedulings 0.099 0.007
(0.148) (0.115)
Constraint on Executive 0.032 -0.033
(0.035) (0.041)
# of reschedulings*Constraint on Executive 0.024
(0.050)
Political Rights -0.023 -0.056
(0.053) (0.052)
# of reschedulings*Political Rights 0.048*
(0.027)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years) -0.246 -0.093
(0.152) (0.076)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)*Constraint on Executive 0.085**
(0.035)
# of reschedulings (over 2 years)*Political Rights 0.061**
(0.024)
Urbanization Rate 0.959 1.013 1.032 1.065
(0.649) (0.778) (0.809) (0.857)
Log of Real GDP -0.294* -0.323* -0.312* -0.341*
(0.150) (0.168) (0.167) (0.179)
Religious Fractionalization 0.740 0.754 0.760 0.741
(0.587) (0.581) (0.543) (0.523)
Log of Population 0.183 0.195 0.191 0.198
(0.138) (0.130) (0.134) (0.127)
Number of Previous Protests 0.029 0.017 0.017 0.014
(0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032)
Continent Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 705 705 690 690
pseudo R-squared 0.124 0.122 0.123 0.118
Dependent Variable:
Dummy = 1 if Protest 2 or 3
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; A constant  term included in each
regression
Table 3: Presence of Severe Protest (Probit Coefficients)
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Constr on
Exec = 1
Constr on
Exec = 2
Constr on
Exec = 3
Constr on
Exec = 4
Constr on
Exec = 5
Constr on
Exec = 6
Constr on
Exec = 7
p-value:
Ho: Column 1 =
Column 7
# of reschedulings = 0 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.409
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.012]
# of reschedulings = 1 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.004
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010]
# of reschedulings = 2 0.040*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.065*** 0.076*** 0.088** 0.101* 0.317
[0.015] [0.013] [0.014] [0.019] [0.028] [0.040] [0.055]
0.040*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.438
[0.012] [0.008] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.007]
0.028*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.000
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
0.019*** 0.026*** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.064*** 0.083*** 0.106*** 0.000
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.011] [0.016] [0.023]
Pr(Protest = 2 or 3)
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates in the top 3 rows derived from Column 1 of Table 3 and estimates in the bottom 3 rows derived from Column 3 of Table 3
Table 4: Probability of Large Protest, varying shock and centralization levels
# of reschedulings = 0
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 1
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 2
  (over 2 years)
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the institutional roots of massive social, economic, and political changes. It employs a
simple economic model which suggests that authorities in centralized economies are relatively insulated from
small shocks but may be susceptible to cascades resulting in massive changes if shocks are larger. This result
arises because citizens living under centralized authorities are more likely to choose actions that differ from
their intrinsic optima, as they face numerous costs from publicly stating their true beliefs. This entails that
small shocks are unlikely to upset the equilibrium outcome under centralized rule; individuals are unwilling
to incur the numerous, sometimes heavy sanctions associated with transgressing the centralized authority’s
dictates. However, a large shock may encourage some citizens to incur these costs, which can trigger a
cascade that results in a massive change in equilibria.
This hypothesis is tested using data from austerity protests in 1976-1992. A regression analysis supports
the model’s hypothesis, suggesting that increasing the number of debt restructurings or renegotiations under-
taken by a country leads to more severe protests in economies with centralized political authorities. Mean-
while, such protests are less likely to occur (though not to a statistically significant degree) in economies with
centralized political authorities when there are zero restructurings.
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Political
Rights = 1
Political
Rights = 2
Political
Rights = 3
Political
Rights = 4
Political
Rights = 5
Political
Rights = 6
Political
Rights = 7
p-value:
Ho: Column 1 =
Column 7
# of reschedulings = 0 0.037** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.679
[0.017] [0.012] [0.009] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.009]
# of reschedulings = 1 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.367
[0.015] [0.013] [0.011] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
# of reschedulings = 2 0.047** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.073*** 0.084*** 0.096*** 0.109*** 0.025
[0.019] [0.021] [0.023] [0.026] [0.030] [0.034] [0.040]
0.048** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.327
[0.020] [0.013] [0.008] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008]
0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.887
[0.015] [0.012] [0.009] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006]
0.042*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.071*** 0.080*** 0.090*** 0.021
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.016] [0.020]
Pr(Protest = 2 or 3)
Standard errors, clustered by region, in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates in the top 3 rows derived from Column 2 of Table 3 and estimates in the bottom 3 rows derived from Column 4 of Table 3
Table 5: Probability of Large Protest, varying shock and centralization levels
# of reschedulings = 0
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 1
  (over 2 years)
# of reschedulings = 2
  (over 2 years)
The model applies to numerous historical and contemporary phenomena. The most recent example is
the Arab Spring of 2011, where citizens who had quietly lived under oppressive, centralized regimes for
decades revolted in massive numbers in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain. Another example is the
fall of communism in the Soviet Union, which was due in part to the multi-faceted sanctions imposed by the
Communist Party, consistent with the logic spelled out in this model. Similarly, the centralization of authority
in Tsarist Russia may have led to the incredible scale of the Bolshevik Revolution (while also explaining
the central government’s ability to suppress numerous smaller outbreaks in the nineteenth century). The
interdependence between the Chinese bureaucracy and Qing rulers may help explain the scale of the Taiping
Rebellion (1850-1864), which followed after massive deflation systemically affected much of the Chinese
countryside. The model also has implications for the future of centralized regimes such as those in Iran,
China, North Korea, and Zimbabwe.39
This paper is not meant to suggest that a general framework exists for predicting revolutions or massive
social change.40 The amount of variables necessary for a revolution to occur likely renders this an impossible
39Of course, the model also has implications for decentralized regimes, especially ones espousing separation between church and state.
Such regimes are less likely to be subject to revolutions, as decentralized authorities have more incentive to respond to the citizenry.
40Nor is this paper meant to lay out any specific prediction concerning the future of centralized economies. Instead, it provides a general
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task. This paper, does, however, suggest that one ubiquitous set of conditions - those associated with the
centralization of coercive power - are conducive to massive changes in equilibrium outcomes.
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